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Abstract
Using a sticky price model with endogenous investment and adjustment costs we analyse
the benefits of monetary policy reacting to asset prices, when investment is under the influ-
ence of a non-fundamental shock, both for inflation-forecast targeting rules and for Taylor
rules. We conclude that in this context there are benefits from reacting to asset prices that
result from a more stable output gap, which is the consequence of a much lower volatility in
firms’ investment. However, welfare gains depend on the source of asset price movements.
Reacting to asset prices when there is a non-fundamental shock to investment stabilises both
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1 Introduction
If movements in stock prices reflected only fundamentals, policymakers would not have to pay
attention to price volatility per se. However, and at least since the seminal work of Shiller (1981),
theoretical and empirical work suggest that fashions and fads, and not only fundamentals, aﬀect
stock prices. Additionally, for policymakers to concern with movements in stock prices those
non-fundamental movements will have to aﬀect real economic activity.
As discussed in Alexandre and Bação (2002) there are three most likely channels by which
equity prices impinge on the real economy: households’ wealth eﬀect, Tobin’s q, and the firms’
balance sheet channel. The first channel, the households’ wealth eﬀect, captures the influence of
asset prices on households’ wealth and then on aggregate consumption. The second and third
channels capture the eﬀect of stock markets on investment (although the balance sheet channel
may also apply to consumption). However, empirical studies have not found a strong reliable
relation between the stock market and consumption, not giving support to an important role for
the wealth eﬀect. Additionally, we concluded that with a wealth eﬀect as estimated in empirical
studies there were no significant benefits from reacting to asset prices. We therefore believe
that the eﬀects of stock prices on the real economy through its eﬀects on investment and its
implications for monetary policy deserve more attention.
Investment in fixed capital is crucial for developments in the real economy. Because of its high
volatility and weight in industrial economies investment is seen, at least since John Maynard
Keynes, as a major determinant of aggregate fluctuations; investment is also the channel by
which new technology is introduced in the economy and therefore decisive for long term growth.
Periods of expansion in stock markets have been associated with great booms in investment.
Examples of that relationship are movements in stock prices and in investment, in the Japanese
economy, during the eighties and, in the American economy, during the nineties. The Japanese
225 stock price index Nikkey climbed from 11 543 in January 1985 to 38 916 - an increase of
237% or an average annual growth rate of 27.5%; the S&P 500 stock price index for the American
economy climbed from 459 in January 1995 to 1521 in September 2000 - an increase of 231% or
an average annual growth rate of 23.5%. For those periods, fixed capital investment increased
at a average annual real growth rate of 9%.
The role of monetary policy during an asset price run-up has been the subject of discussion
among economists and policymakers at least since the 20s and the Great Depression that fol-
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lowed.1 The research on this topic was most increased after the bubble in stock and housing
markets in the Japanese economy, in the eighties, and its burst in the nineties, and the potential
repetition of those events in the US economy. That reaction by the Fed has now, that the
booming market is over and the American economy is on the edge of recession, increased the
criticisms on Chairman Alan Greenspan on its easy monetary policy. Critics argue that it had
contributed to the development of the stock market bubble and the boom investment that is
responsible for part of the now existing excess of capacity in the American economy.
In the nineties, the inflation-targeting regime was almost universally accepted as the ideal
monetary policy regime and, in their 1999 influential paper, Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler
argue that that regime will always deliver the best result either there is a bubble or not. That
is, according to that view, ”monetary policy should not respond to changes in asset prices,
except insofar as they signal changes in expected inflation”. Although that view is almost
consensual among economists, it has been the subject of some criticisms, notably by Cecchetti
et al (2000). One argument against that view was the one, then very prescient, put forward by
Olivier Blanchard, in January 2000. In his view, a flexible inflation-targeting regime may not
be the best monetary policy strategy to deal with a bubble economy because overvalued stock
prices may induce firms to invest more than is justified by fundamentals, with a resulting excess
of capital accumulation in the economy. On the same vein, William Poole (2001) discussing the
role of asset prices to monetary policy asserts, ”the distorted price signals from the stock market
permitted the industry to raise capital easily and cheaply, which certainly contributed to the
overexpansion.” In this context, William Dupor (2001) argues that asset prices inflation should
be taken into account by policymakers as an indicator of capital overaccumulation.
Following this idea, we use a sticky price model with endogenous investment being driven
by non-fundamental movements in asset prices to question the potential benefits of monetary
policy reacting to asset prices. We assume that equity prices are contaminated by sentiment -
i.e., deviations from rationality - and that they can distort firms’ investment decisions: managers
cannot disentangle sentiment and information about fundamentals what can motivate ’wrong’
investment decisions. In case of a bubble in stock prices it can result in an excess of capital
accumulation.
In section 2 we briefly discuss the relationship between stock prices and investment. In
section 3 we describe the empirical findings on firms’ reaction to investors’ sentiment. In section
4 we present a sticky price model with endogenous investment and adjustment costs and analyse
1For a description of the issue of monetary policy and asset prices see Alexandre and Bação (2002).
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the benefits of monetary policy reacting to asset prices. Section 5 analyses the dynamics of the
system when this is hit by a technology and a non-fundamental shock. Section 6 anlyses the
issue of asset price versus inflation stabilization. Section 7 concludes.
2 The channels of stock prices to investment
As mentioned above, there are strong reasons to believe that stock prices are ’infected by sen-
timent’. Another question is the extent to which firms should react to it. Blanchard, Rhee
and Summers (1993) looking at the eﬀect of market valuations, even if it diﬀers from managers’
assessment of fundamentals, on investment describe the opposite views of Bosworth (1975) and
Fisher and Merton (1984). As Bosworth (1975) put it, ”The stock market and investment be-
haviour are intimately bound together since firms invest to earn profits, and activity in the stock
market represents an attempt by investors to evaluate the magnitudes of that stream of profits.”
However, Bosworth (1975) argues that managers should ignore the information from the market
and base their investment decisions on their own valuation of fundamentals. In that case the
market would be a sideshow with no eﬀect on investment decisions.
On the other hand, Fischer and Merton (1984) argue that managers should simply consider
the stock market valuation and ’explore investor sentiment’. In the authors’ opinion firms in
taking their investment decisions should react to stock prices changes, whether or not they
coincide with their assessment of fundamentals: firms should follow investor exuberance and
invest until the marginal product of capital equals the rate of return he expects. In this case,
sentiment, that is, non-fundamental movements in asset prices, aﬀects investment and, therefore,
the real economy.
Although there is by now enough evidence that stock returns predict investment (Mork et
al: 1990) the channels that make that correlation hold are not so evident. The most mentioned
channel between stock prices and investment is the Tobin’s q, first presented in Tobin (1969): q
is the ratio of the market’s valuation of capital to its replacement cost. For example, an increase
in stock prices increases the value of capital relative to the cost of acquiring new capital and thus
increases investment demand by firms. However, several studies (see, for example, Summers:
1981; Barro: 90; Blanchard, Rhee and Summers: 1993; and Chirinko: 1993) have shown that q
is not a good predictor of investment at least when compared to other variables.
Another important channel from which stock prices influences investment is the most em-
phasised balance sheet channel (see, for example, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist: 1999; and
Kiyotaki and Moore: 1995): stock prices aﬀect firms’ net worth and thus their costs of financing,
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by its impact on the collateral firms can oﬀer to banks, what aﬀects investment.
Mork, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) when revising the diﬀerent channels from stock prices
to investment mention the one that stresses the fact that managers, when making investment
decisions, have in the stock market a source of information that may or may not correctly
describe future fundamentals. According to this view, the active informant hypothesis, stock
prices predict investment because they convey relevant information to managers when deciding
on investment. It is arguable that the market does inform managers of firms, which have to
take investment decisions, about, for example, the future state of the economy, namely, future
aggregate or individual demand. According to Mork et al (1990) the active informant hypothesis
is more plausible for the market as a whole in the sense that is more arguable that managers
can benefit from stock market signals from the market as a whole than from market signals
about their own businesses. However, that information contained in stock prices can accurately,
or inaccurately, predict fundamentals. It can inaccurately predict fundamentals because of its
inherent unpredictability ”or because stock prices are contaminated by sentiment that managers
cannot separate from information about fundamentals” (Mork et al: 1990). In that case, sen-
timent - that is, the component of stock prices that is not explained by fundamentals - may
distort investment decisions through the false signals it transmits to the managers. According
to the Mork et al (1990) terminology, in that case, the stock market will be a ’faulty active
informant’.
Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) mention that, ”Large movements in asset prices tend to be
associated with waves of optimism and pessimism about the future”. If there is some irrational
exuberance in the stock market driving prices up because investors believe in a New Era economy,
as described in Shiller (2000) and as it happened during the 90s with the dotcoms, as recent
events seem to confirm, then firms can be ’forced’ to follow that enthusiasm and invest beyond
what would be suggested by fundamentals. This excess of optimism or pessimism easily feeds in
investment decisions as John Maynard Keynes soon noticed in what he named ’animal spirits’.
This result is related to Shiller’s New Era idea: in some periods, often associated with the
appearance of a new technology, there is a widespread sense of living in a new age where high
economic growth will rest forever. That certainly happened in the American economy during the
nineties, and certainly contributed for the euphoria in the stock market and for the high levels
of investment. The levels of investment were conspicuously high in the new economy firms2.
2 In The General Theory, John M. Keynes stressed the role of uncertainty in investment decisions and how
optimistic or pessimistic states - ’animal spirits’ in Keynes’ words - are crucial to firms’ investment decisions.
Changes in investment decisions were then seen was one of the main forces driving the cycle.
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Another channel mentioned by Mork et al (1990) for stock prices to influence investment
beyond what is predicted by fundamentals is by the pressure it may exert on managers. This
stock market pressure hypothesis is similar to the faulty informant hypothesis in the sense
that managers can try to extract more information from stock prices than it conveyed about
fundamentals. Thus, the result again can be distortion in investment decisions.
3 Investment and stock prices: empirical evidence
Next we present the results of empirical work that evaluate how stock prices aﬀect investment
when firms have the information about fundamentals. A first problem in this literature is that
fundamentals are unobservable by the econometrician and therefore a proxy has to be chosen -
sales and cash flow in Mork et al (1990) and profits or its expected present discounted value as
in Blanchard et al (1993) - and that is not independent of the results. Another remark is on the
choice of the variable for market valuation, that is, Tobin’s q or the stock price. The use of q can
easily result in measurement error problems, given the problems involved in the construction of
q, namely, the construction of capital at replacement cost. As we will see, one result of these
studies is that stock prices outperform q in explaining investment.
Mork et al (1990) regress investment growth - the growth of real capital expenditures exclud-
ing acquisitions - on stock returns and the growth in fundamental variables in order to see how
important the stock market is after controlling for fundamentals - the growth rates of sales and
cash flow. As they put it, they try to answer the following question, ”If managers knew future
fundamentals, would orthogonal movements in share price still help predict their investment
decisions?”
Although they concluded that they could never reject the null hypothesis that investor
sentiment does not aﬀect investment through the stock market, their results suggest that it is
not the most important factor in explaining investment. For firm-level data they conclude that
investor sentiment has a very small explanatory power for investment and they conclude that
the ”market may not be a complete sideshow, but nor is it very central”. The same results
were achieved from aggregate data leading the authors to conclude, ”The stock market is a
sometimes faulty predictor of the future, which does not receive much attention and does not
influence aggregate investment”.
In his study on the eﬀects of stock prices on investment, Barro (1990) concludes that stock
prices are an important determinant of for US investment, especially for long-term samples,
and even when he controls for cash flow variables. He also concludes that the stock market
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outperforms a standard q-variable in explaining investment.
Another important paper on the eﬀects of stock prices on investment is the one by Blanchard,
Rhee and Summers (1993). These authors analyse whether investment moves more with the
stock market or with fundamentals - using as a proxy, first, the expected present discounted value
of the profit rate on information available as of the time of investment, and, then, the profit rate
- using time series for the period 1900-1990. When controlling for fundamentals, and especially
when they use profits as a proxy, they conclude that market valuation has a limited eﬀect
in explaining investment behaviour over the period of analysis and that ”time series evidence
strongly rejects the hypothesis that managers simply follow the market valuation”. However,
they conclude that stock prices matter with ”an increase of 1% in the market valuation not
matched by an increase in fundamentals leads to an increase in investment of 0.45%”.
The study of the relationship between stock prices and investment is of great interest during
periods of marked deviations of stock prices from fundamentals. This is the case of the 20s and
the Great Depression and the crash of 1987, for example. The examination of both periods by
Barro (1990) led him to conclude that managers don’t closely follow the market valuation in
their investment decisions. Firms invested less during the 20s than implied by market valuation;
and after the 1929 crash, investment fell more than the fall in the stock market would suggest.
From the analysis of the 1987 crash the conclusion is that firms must have considered other
information than market valuation for investment was ”surprisingly strong”. Blanchard et al
(1993) reached the same conclusion.
Two other periods of marked deviations from the fundamentals are the second half of the 80s
in Japan and the 90s in the American economy. Although there are already several works on the
events in the Japanese economy, the American economy in the 90s is certainly worth of further
research. Looking at the Japanese economy in the 80s, Chirinko and Schaller (2001), using
diﬀerent types of evidence conclude that there was a bubble in the in equity markets and that it
aﬀected business fixed investment. The authors first confirm that the stock market boom of the
late 80’s coincided with high levels of business fixed investment and that, at the peak in 1989,
the funds raised from security issues covered almost 90 percent of the expenditures on business
fixed investment by the principal Japanese enterprises, when usually it covers only 30%. Using a
non-structural forecasting equation and controlling for other macroeconomic factors that might
have aﬀected investment, the authors concluded ”that the investment /capital ratio was about
20 percent higher than predicted by these factors in the late 1980’s, but lower than predicted
following the crash”. This evidence is reinforced by the use of orthogonality tests, first used
by Hall (1978), and parametric estimates; from these they concluded that the bubble ”boosted
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fixed investment by approximately 6-9 percent in the years 1987-89”.
Bond and Cummins (2001)
Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2002)
The overall conclusion of these empirical studies is that market valuation, when considering
fundamentals as cash flow and profits, has a role, although a limited one, in the determination
of investment decisions. That is, the stock market is not a sideshow; it aﬀects real economic
activity.
4 A model with investment under the influence of sentiment
In presenting the active informant hypothesis Mork et al (90) argue that stock prices influence
investment because they convey relevant information - as about future demand - relevant for
firms’ decisions. However, as the authors remarke the information about fundamentals in stock
prices can be accurate or inaccurate. In the later case the stock market will be a ’faulty active
informant’ and may distort investment decisions through false signals to managers.
We can therefore ask if in periods of enthusiasm or optimism about the future with stock
prices booming and firms induced to invest beyond what fundamentals would imply or, on the
other hand, during a wave of pessimism, a crash in stock prices and delays in the implementation
of investment projects, there is something monetary policy can do to improve things. That is,
does the distortionary eﬀect of the bubble on investment provide an argument, in terms of output
and inflation stabilisation, in favour of asset price stabilisation?
Dupor (2002) develops a sticky price-imperfect competition model with endogenous capital
accumulation and investment adjustment costs and concludes that optimal monetary policy
should react to non-fundamental movements in asset prices. His argument is, however, very
diﬀerent from the one put forward by Cecchetti et al (2000). In his model, asset price inflation
is relevant for monetary policy not because it signals nominal price inflation but because it can
be an indicator of distortions in the capital market. Dupor (2002) determines the optimal policy
and concludes that is optimal for the central bank to react to asset prices when a bubble in
asset prices generates distortion in investment decisions. According to his results asset price
inflation may be relevant for policymakers because it ”may provide an indicator of capital
overaccumulation, which cannot be gleaned from examining consumer or price inflation”. The
reaction of optimal monetary policy to non-fundamental movements in asset prices stabilises
both nominal price inflation and non-fundamental asset price movements. In his model there
is a deviation from rational expectations in that firms can ’misestimate the future return to
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current capital accumulation’ what aﬀects investment and asset price movements; when firms
overestimate them, investment increases and asset prices run-up.
In Bernanke and Gertler (1999) model they allow for bubbles in stock prices but its eﬀect
on the real economy is transmitted through the balance sheet channel and a wealth eﬀect: in-
vestment decisions by firms are based on fundamentals. Thus, in Bernanke and Gertler (1999)
non-fundamental movements in asset prices don’t aﬀect investment directly with firms’ invest-
ment decisions being based on fundamental q. However in their model the bubble aﬀects firms’
behaviour through its impact on their net worth.
In our analysis we use a Dynamic New Keynesian framework with endogenous investment
and adjustment costs developed by Casares and McCallum (2000). In this model we include
an ad hoc term in the investment equation, that should be seen as a shock to fundamentals,
representing a deviation from rationality, that distorts firms’ investment decisions.
4.1 The model
The model presented in Casares and McCallum (2000) is a model with monopolistic competition
and nominal price rigidities to allow for non-neutral eﬀects of monetary policy. In the appendix
we provide a more detailed description of the model, with emphasis on the derivation of the
equilibrium conditions for consumption and investment. The system is described by the following
log linearised around the steady state equations,
yt = w1ct + w2xt (1)
ct = Etct+1 − ρ−1(it − πt) + βνt (2)
xt =
1
1 + δ
Etxt+1 +Ω [ΘEtf2t+1 − (it −Etπt+1) + ψt] +
δ
1 + δ
kt (3)
kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + δkt (4)
f2t = f2(n
ss, kss)(yt − kt) (5)
at = ρaat−1 + εat (6)
y¯t = (1− α)at + αkt (7)
y˜t = yt − y¯t (8)
πt = φ0Etπt+1 + (1− φ0)πt−1 + φ1y˜t + επt (9)
All variables represent percent deviations around the steady state, except inflation and the
interest rate that are in levels. Equations (1) to (8) describe what can be called the IS sector of
that economy. Equation (1) is the overall resource constraint with w1 and w2 giving the steady-
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state shares of consumption, ct, and investment, xt, respectively, in total output. Equation
(2) is the Euler equation for consumption where it depends positively on its own next period’s
expected value and negatively on the real interest rate. Additionally, consumption depends on
a preference shock, νt, that is assumed to follow an AR(1) process. Here, unlike in Alexandre
and Bação (2002), we don’t consider any wealth eﬀect of stock prices on consumption because
we want to concentrate on the eﬀects of the stock market on investment.
Equation (3) is, in Casares and McCallum (2000) words, an ’expectational investment equa-
tion’ as investment, xt, depends on its own next period’s expected value. Investment also
depends on the diﬀerence between the expected return on physical capital, Eft+1, and the re-
turn on the financial asset, rt, that the authors above refer to as the real asset premium. The
coeﬃcient of this term, Ω = 1(1+δ)ηC1(xss,kss) , should be read as the semi-elasticity of investment
relative to the real asset’s premium and depends on the adopted adjustment cost specification
and parameterization. The inclusion of costs in installing capital - besides its theoretical jus-
tification - results from the fact that, in its absence, capital, the marginal product of capital,
and the marginal product of labour are too much volatile than observed in the data. Among
the diﬀerent adjustment cost specification considered in Casares and McCallum (2000) we chose
that that makes, as shown in Hayashi (1982), the average value of Tobin’s q equal to its marginal
value: that is, total adjustment cost depends not only on the amount of new capital invested
but also on the stock of capital, implying constant returns to scale for the production function
net of adjustment costs. This specification is of interest to us because, in this case, the marginal
value of q, that is a suﬃcient statistic to determine the level of investment by firms, is equal to
the market value of capital.
Additionally we include an ad hoc term,ψt, that should be seen as a shock to fundamentals,
representing a deviation from rationality, which results in a distortion in investment decisions.
The introduction of that non-fundamental shock represents a deviation from rationality and will
imply that firms will sometimes misestimate the gap between the expected return on capital and
the real interest rate, what will imply a distortion in investment decisions. The non-fundamental
shock will therefore aﬀect investment and asset prices. That shock, when positive, will result in
an overestimation of the gap between the expected return on physical capital and the interest
rate and will, therefore, stimulate investment beyond what fundamentals suggest. We thus
assume that the stock market will be, in this case, a ”faulty active informant” in Mork et al
(1990) terminology. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as a misalignment in the fundamental
value of capital, which aﬀects investment through a q eﬀect and thus the real economy. We
assume that the shock to fundamentals follow an autoregressive process, ψt = ρfψt−1 + εft.
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Equation (4) is the log-linearized form of the investment definition. Equation (5) is the log
linear approximation to the marginal product of capital for a Cobb-Douglas production form.
Equation (6) describes the process followed by the labour augmenting technology. Equation (7)
gives natural output, that is, the output that would prevail if there was no deviation from full
price flexibility. Equation (8) defines the output gap as the deviation of output from its natural
level.
Equation (9) depicts the price-adjustment process - the Phillips curve - in the economy.
This specification diﬀers from the New Phillips curve as it includes a backward-looking term for
inflation that is believed to match the data more closely. This price adjustment specification is
similar to the one adopted by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and produces both price and inflation
inertia. These authors found that this hybrid Phillips curve fits empirically well the USA data.
The model is completed with a rule for the monetary policy instrument, the nominal interest
rate, and is described in section 4.2.
The value of the parameters used in our simulation exercise are as in Casares and McCallum
(2000) and are summarised in table 1:
Table 1: Parameters’ values
ρ α δ φ0 φ1 ρa ρv Ω Θ w1 w2
5 0.36 0.025 0.5 0.13 0.95 0.3 2.5 0.03 0.78 0.22
There is no consensus on most values of the parameters in our model. We use a value of 0.13
for the hybrid Phillips curve coeﬃcient on the output gap. This is a higher value than the one
used in Casares McCallum (2000), 0.03, and follows the value estimated in Rudebusch (2000)
that is thought to be a more reasonable value.
4.2 Simple policy rules
In this model, monetary policy is implemented through simple monetary policy rules for the
nominal interest rate, the instrument of the central bank. All are interest rate rules, and all
are simple rules, in that they make the interest rate dependent on the values taken by a small
number of key variables. The exclusive use of interest rate rules for policy rests on the evidence
that virtually all industrialized countries’ central banks use some short-term (nominal) interest
rate as their policy instrument (Walsh, 1998).
Simple rules have been widely discussed among academics and in wider discussions about
monetary policy. It has been argued that, particularly when they include forward-looking ele-
ments, they may have some advantages when compared to optimal rules (Batini and Haldane,
1999). Firstly, simple rules may be more robust in the presence of uncertainty about the actual
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model of the economy (as there always is), than optimal rules, which are typically functions of all
the predetermined state variables of the model (Taylor, 1999). Secondly, it is argued that simple
rules, when including forward-looking variables, can perform almost as well as optimal rules in
output and inflation stabilization, and still enhance transparency and make the central bank
more accountable, resulting, therefore, in higher credibility. Of course, because simple rules
do not use all the information available they will not in general be optimal (Black et al, 1997).
There is of course a debate as to their descriptive realism. On the one hand, Taylor (1993) has
argued that a simple rule — the Taylor rule — was a good description of the Federal Reserve’s
interest rate policy, and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) have argued that the Bundesbank
can be represented as having set German interest rates in response to a few key variables. On
the other hand, Ryan and Thompson (2000) remark that no central bank actually uses a simple
rule. Rudebush and Svensson (1999) argue that central banks use all the information available
when setting interest rates.
We next briefly describe each of the interest rate rules used in this paper. The symbols used
in the following equations are defined as follows: it nominal interest rate; πt inflation rate; yt the
output gap; qt fundamental value of capital; ψt is the non-fundamental shock in the investment
equation, described in more detail above in the discussion of the model. All are measured as log
deviations from targets except for the nominal interest rate and inflation which is in levels.
We consider the inflation-forecast based policy rule where the policy instrument reacts to
deviations of inflation from its next period expected value,
it = γEtπt+1 (10)
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) show that inflation-forecast targeting rules are a good
empirical description of the actual behaviour of several central banks since 1979. This class of
policy rules mimics the behaviour of inflation targeting regimes, as argued in Alexandre et al
(2002) and elsewhere, that is, according to Bernanke and Gertler (1999), the ideal monetary
policy strategy whether there is a bubble or not, because price and financial stability are highly
complementary and consistent objectives.
We then consider the case in which the monetary policy rule reacts not only to deviations
of inflation from the target but also to the asset price:
it = γ1Etπt+1 + γ2qt (11)
The behaviour of the system under this policy rule will allow us to assess the arguments of
the defenders of a reaction to asset prices when there is some form of irrationality driving their
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value. Willam Dupor (2002) found it optimal to react to the asset price because it provides
an indicator of capital accumulation, which cannot be identified through the consumer price
inflation.
We also consider an inflation-forecast targeting policy rule in which the policy instrument
instead of reacting to the value of capital itself reacts to its deviations from fundamentals, that
is, it reacts directly to the non-fundamental shock:
it = γ1Etπt+1 + γ2ψt
In this rule we assume that central banks can identify misalignments in asset prices and that
firms cannot.
Additionally, we look at Taylor rules, after Taylor (1993), in which the interest rate reacts
to deviations of output and inflation from the target:
it = λ1πt−1 + λ2yt−1 (12)
The main arguments for Taylor rules rest on their simplicity, with the transparency and
accountability that the central bank gains thereby, and on the fact that they describe actual
monetary policy in several countries since the mid eighties (see, for example, Taylor, 1993).
We also consider the case, in which the policy instrument also reacts to the asset price,
it = λ1πt−1 + λ2yt−1 + λ3qt (13)
and a policy rule in which the interest rate policy instrument also reacts to the non-fundamental
shock,
it = λ1πt + λ2yt + λ3ψt (14)
In choosing the optimised coeﬃcients for the classes of policy rules described above we
consider that the policymaker tries to minimise the variance of inflation, output an of the policy
instrument. We therefore consider a loss function of the following form,
L = V (πt) +w3V (yt) + w4V (Rt −Rt−1) (15)
The inclusion of output and inflation in the central bank’s loss function reflects the wide
agreement that they represent the most important concerns of policymakers - even inflation
targeters as the Bank of England claim that they are not ”inflation nutters”, in Mervyn King
words. The inclusion of an interest rate smoothing term in the expected loss reduces volatility
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of the policy instrument and is justified, among other reasons, because policymakers are very
concerned about financial stability (Mishkin, 1999). This loss can be derived from a micro-
founded optimal general equilibrium model but without endogenous investment, as shown in
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), as second-order approximation to the utility function of the
representative agent.
In the baseline simulations the same weight is given to the variance of output and inflation,
and half of this weight is given to the variance of the policy instrument.
To solve this linear rational expectations model we employed the Schur decomposition as
described in Soderlind (1999), after writing the model in the Blanchard-Kahn form.
4.3 Non-fundamental shock persistence: sensitivity analysis
There is great uncertainty in the volatility of stock prices that is due to fluctuations in the
non-fundamental component (Balke, Nathan and Woahar, 2002). The part of the volatility in
stock prices that results from the volatility in the non-fundamental component will depend both
on the degree of persistence and on the variance of the shock. We therefore do a sensitivity
analysis for both parameters of the non-fundamental shock.
As in Alexandre and Bação (2002) we start by considering an identity matrix for the variance-
covariance matrix of the shocks considered in the model, and compute the optimised coeﬃcients
and the loss for diﬀerent degrees of persistence in the non-fundamental shock in the investment
equation. The results for the inflation targeting rule, reacting and not reacting to the non-
fundamental shock, are presented in Table 2:
Table 2: Degree of persistence in the non-fundamental shock
0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
IFT λ1 = 1.6 λ1 = 1.69 λ1 = 1.95 λ1 = 2.54
Loss 6.15 6.48 7.17 8.51
IFT+S λ1 = 1.56;λ2 = 0.41 λ1 = 1.56;λ2 = 0.59 λ1 = 1.56;λ2 = 0.75 λ1 = 1.6;λ2 = 0.77
Loss 5.92 5.97 5.98 6.038
IFT+q λ1 = 1.86;λ3 = 0.41 λ1 = 2.2;λ3 = 0.82 λ1 = 2.74;λ3 = 1.49 λ1 = 2.58;λ3 = 1.248
Loss 6.01 6.17 6.27 6.27
As expected the social welfare loss decreases with the degree of persistence of the non-
fundamental shock. When we compare the results of reacting and not reacting to the non-
fundamental shock we conclude that there is always a welfare benefit from reacting to asset
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prices and that it increases with the degree of persistence of the shock. The same pattern of
results is found for the Taylor rule.
Now we do some sensitivity analysis for the variance of the non-fundamental shock. As what
is of interest in our study is the variance of the non-fundamental shock relative to the variance
of other shocks, we performed our sensitivity analysis for the cases where the variance of the
non-fundamental shock is two times and five times the variance of the other shocks, additionally
to the case presented above in which the variances of all the shocks in the model are equal
to one (see tables in the appendix). We conclude that, for both classes of policy rules, there
are significant benefits, in terms of loss, from reacting to both the non-fundamental shock and
the asset price itself, with the bulk of it coming from a much more stable output gap. The
lower volatility in the output gap results from a conspicuously higher investment stability, as
consumption appears to be only slightly volatile.
Inflation doesn’t seem to be significantly aﬀected by the variance of the shock. The policy
instrument becomes much more volatile as the variance of the non-fundamental shock increases
and, for all the cases in analysis, a reaction to both the non-fundamental shock and the funda-
mental value of capital makes it much more stable.
We, therefore, conclude that changes in the variance of the non-fundamental shock appear
to result only in diﬀerences in the magnitude of the variance of the system, with the quality of
the results being unchanged.
In the analysis that follows we will concentrate on the case of very high persistence, 0.9, in
the non-fundamental shock, that is, a case in which the gap between the expected return on
capital and the real interest rate that determines investment deviate for a long period from the
fundamentals, and we will consider through our analysis a variance-covariance matrix of shocks
equal to the identity matrix.
4.4 The variance of the system under the diﬀerent policy rules
The variances of the system are computed as described in Alexandre et al (2002). The optimised
coeﬃcients for the diﬀerent classes of policy rules are given in Table 3:
Table 3: Optimal Parameters in Policy Rules
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yt−1 πt−1 Etπt+1 S q
IFT 2.54
IFT+S 1.6 0.77
IFT+q 2.58 1.25
TR 2.04 0.72
TR+S 1.36 0.45 0.72
TR+q 1.81 0.48 1.03
Using those coeﬃcients we compute the loss and the variance of the system’s variables for
the diﬀerent policy rules and compare their results, namely, the benefits of reacting either to
the asset price itself or to the shock in fundamentals. Table 4 below contains the results.
Table 4: Measures of macroeconomic performance under alternative policy rules.
IFT IFT+S IFT+q TR TR+S TR+q
V(R) 9.91 6.24 6.74 9.49 5.8 7.48
V(K) 46.57 41.63 40.92 47.63 42.14 41.57
V(f2) 18.93 16.66 16.45 20.41 17.83 17.9
V(y¯) 12.81 12.16 11.94 12.93 12.19 11.9
V(y) 16.87 14.01 13.76 16.98 14.36 13.7
V(y˜) 3.82 1.75 1.98 3.88 2.15 2.22
V(c) 12.85 13 12.87 12.57 12.9 12.5
V(π) 2.79 2.91 2.88 2.96 2.57 3.09
V(x) 209.56 159.51 157.6 219.9 167.34 166.12
V(Rt −Rt−1) 3.79 2.74 2.81 7.08 3.47 4.47
V(q) 11.27 5.73 5.76 12.4 6.72 6.79
Loss 8.51 6.04 6.27 10.38 6.45 7.54
The first result we should stress is that inflation-forecast targeting rules perform better
than Taylor rules in terms of the overall loss. This result comes from a less volatile inflation,
output gap and interest rate smoothing term in the inflation-forecast targeting rule. In this
case inflation is stabilised without a higher cost in terms of output variability, as it seems to
be in Alexandre, Driﬃll and Spagnolo (2002) and in Alexandre and Bação (2002). The policy
instrument is also less volatile in the inflation-forecast targeting rule. The more stable output
gap in the inflation-forecast targeting rule case comes from a lower volatility in investment, as
the consumption variance is slightly higher than in the Taylor rule.
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4.5 Reacting or not reacting to the shock in fundamentals and to asset prices
According to Bernanke and Gertler (1999) a flexible inflation targeting regime is the most
adequate monetary strategy to deal with non-fundamental movements in asset prices. Thus, in
their view central banks should adjust the interest rate policy instrument whenever expected
inflation deviates from the target and monetary policy should, therefore, respond to movements
in asset prices only insofar as they aﬀect expected inflation.
Blanchard (2000) criticise the view of Bernanke and Gertler (1999) on how monetary policy
should deal with misalignments in asset prices from their fundamental value or, in the more
extreme case, with bubbles with the argument that although it stabilises inflation (and the
output gap) it will result in an excess of capital accumulation. Assuming that investment is under
the influence of both, the real interest rate and the bubble, while consumption is less sensitive
to the bubble - in our example consumption is not aﬀected directly by the non-fundamental
shock - and that the central bank increases the interest rate, aiming at stabilizing inflation,
the result will be a higher decrease in consumption compared to investment, representing a
change in the composition of output. The economy would in the end have too much capital and
too less consumption. In sum, according to Olivier Blanchard the use of an inflation targeting
strategy when there is some sort of irrationality in asset prices will result in excessive capital
accumulation because monetary policy is not aggressive enough to pin down its distortionary
eﬀect on investment. We therefore look at the benefits of trying to stabilise investment by
making the policy instrument react to the deviation of asset prices from fundamentals or to
asset prices themselves additionally to deviations of inflation from the target.
From the analysis of the table above we conclude that there are gains in terms of welfare
from reacting to the non-fundamental shock or to the asset price, in the both the Taylor rule
and the inflation-targeting forecast rule. Reacting to the non-fundamental shock delivers the
best result in terms of loss welfare. In that case the loss is reduced from 8.51 to 6.04 in the
inflation-targeting forecast case, and from 10.38 to 6.45 in the Taylor rule case.
The benefits from reacting to the non-fundamental shock and to asset prices result from a
more stable output gap, which is the consequence of a more stable investment: the variance of
investment is reduced by approximately 25.5% for the inflation-forecast targeting rule and by
24,5% for the Taylor rule, for both the reaction to the non-fundamental shock and to the funda-
mental value of capital. A reaction to both the non-fundamental shock and to the fundamental
value of capital results in very small changes in the variance of inflation and consumption.
The results presented above seem therefore to give support to the arguments of Blanchard
17
(2000) and other defenders of the ’bubble view’ as, for example, William Dupor (2002) from the
University of Pennsylvania, who criticize the view of Bernanke and Gertler (99) that a flexible
inflation targeting regime is the most appropriate monetary policy strategy to deal with an asset
price run-up whether or not it is driven by non-fundamental movements.
5 Impulse response functions
In order to better describe the dynamics of the system we present the graphs for the impulse
response functions for diﬀerent shocks with the policy instrument reacting and not reacting to
the fundamental value of capital. In appendix 2 we present the graphs for the diﬀerent policy
rules. In order to better contrast the eﬀects of reacting and not reacting to the non-fundamental
shock and to the q value, we present both situations in the same graph for the relevant variables.
We concentrate on the results for the inflation-forecast targeting policy rule, as it yields the best
macroeconomic performance.
As we saw above, Cecchetti et al (2000) defend that monetary policy should lean against
the wind of significant asset price movements if these disturbances originate in asset markets
themselves. Bernanke and Gertler (1999) point the diﬃculties in identifying the source in asset
prices misalignments as one of the main arguments against reacting to asset prices. In Alexandre
and Bação (2002) we concluded that the desirability of reacting to asset prices depended on the
type of shock hitting the economy. Therefore we analyse the behaviour of the system under the
non-fundamental shock and under a shock in the labour-augmenting technology.
5.1 Non-fundamental shock
The eﬀects of reacting to the non-fundamental shock, in the case of the inflation-targeting fore-
cast rule, that deserve to be stressed are the following. A non-fundamental shock to investment
results in an increase in investment and in a decrease in consumption for both policy rules (see
fig. 1 and fig. 2). When the economy is under the influence of a positive non-fundamental
shock that results in an increase in investment, for the reasons described above, and monetary
policy is targeting inflation, investment will still go up and consumption, that is assumed not
to depend directly on the fad, will decrease following the increase in the interest rate. This
will result in too much capital in the economy. These results support the findings in Dupor
(2002), and the arguments of Blanchard (2000), that pursuing an inflation targeting strategy
when there is some form of irrationality aﬀecting the value of asset prices will result in too much
investment at the cost of a lower consumption with what it implies in terms of a misallocation
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of the resources of the economy. Following the argument of Olivier Blanchard, among others, of
reacting to deviations of the expected inflation from the target and, additionally, to deviations
from fundamentals results in a smaller departure of investment from its equilibrium value (its
initial deviation from equilibrium is reduced by almost 30% when compared to the inflation
targeting case) while consumption becomes even more depressed. The higher decrease in con-
sumption when the policy instrument reacts to the asset price results from a higher real interest
rate than in the previous case (see fig. 3).
However, the output gap and inflation become more stable when the policy instrument reacts
to the non-fundamental shock additionally to the deviations of expected inflation from the target
(see figs. 4 and 5). Computing the squared deviations from equilibrium for both variables and
for both policy rules we get the values in table 4:
Table 4: sum of squared deviations
Inflation Output gap
IFT 1.033 0.319
IFT+q 0.0869 0.0001
From the table the stabilising eﬀects in terms of output gap and inflation from reacting to
the asset price are evident.
5.2 Technology shock
Now we look at the results for the output gap and inflation of reacting to asset prices additionally
to reacting to deviations of expected inflation from the target, when the economy is hit by a
labour-augmenting technology shock. In this case we conclude that reacting to asset prices when
the source of the misalignment is a technology shock makes inflation and the output gap more
unstable. Computing the squared deviations from equilibrium for both variables and for both
policy rules we get the values in table 5:
Table 5: sum of squared deviations
Inflation Output gap
IFT 0.0095 0.0002
IFT+q 0.248 0.02367
From the values in the table we can see the destabilising eﬀects in terms of output gap and
inflation from reacting to the asset price when the economy is hit by a technology shock. The
reaction of the policy instrument to the asset price motivates a higher real interest rate (see
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fig. 8), relatively to the situation in which the policy instrument only reacts to deviations of
the expected inflation from the target, what results in a higher decrease in the output gap and
inflation (see figs. 6 and 7). Decrease in the output gap despite the increase in consumption
and investment is because the natural output increases more than actual output in result of the
technology shock.
We then conclude, as in Alexandre and Bação (2002), that the origin of the shock matters
for the decision of whether reacting to asset prices and that, as Cecchetti et al (2000) argue,
monetary policy should lean against the wind of significant asset price movements if these
disturbances originate in the asset markets themselves.
6 Asset price and inflation stabilisation
Cecchetti et al (2000) and Mundell (2000) argue that central bankers pursuing price stability
will more easily reach that target by reacting to asset prices. In figs. 4 and 8 in the appendix
is depicted the reaction of both the inflation and the asset price to a non-fundamental shock
when the policy instrument reacts and when it doesn’t react to the asset price in addition to
deviations of the expected inflation from the target. From their analysis we can conclude that
reacting to asset prices when a non-fundamental shock aﬀects the economy makes inflation and
the asset price more stable.
The same result can be observed using the sum of squares for inflation and q for both policy
rules in table 6,
Table 6: sum of squared deviations
Inflation Output gap
IFT 1.033 2.487
IFT+q 0.087 1.854
Our results seem to support the argument set forth in Cecchetti et al (2000) as both the asset
price and inflation seem to be more stable when the policy instrument reacts to asset price in
addition to deviations of the expected inflation from the target. However, that result contrasts
with the result in Dupor (2002), in the context of a fully optimal policy rule, that finds that
asset price stabilisation is achieve at a higher cost in terms of inflation.
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7 Conclusion
At least since the seminal work of Shiller (1981) theoretical and empirical work suggest that
fashions and fads, and not only fundamentals, drive stock prices. Additionally, empirical studies
have found evidence that invesment may be aﬀected by a non-fundamental component in asset
prices; that is, the impact of asset price movements on investment, either through a q eﬀect or
a balance sheet channel eﬀect, may be a most likely channel by which asset prices impinge on
the real economy. Periods of expansion in stock markets have been associated with great booms
in investment, as in the eighties in the Japanese economy and in the nineties in the American
economy. Although high investment rates is of great importance for long term growth, if firms
in taking investment decisions are responding to distorted signals from the stock market, the
economy can end with too much capital. The consequences of overinvestment as a result of
an asset price run-up and the role for monetary policy in this context has been the subject of
discussion among economists and policymakers at least since the 20s and the Great Depression
that followed. The bubble in the stock and in the housing markets in the Japanese economy,
in the eighties, and its burst in the nineties, and the potential repetition of those events in the
American economy have raised a wide discussion on what monetary policy can and cannot do
to avoid the deranging eﬀects of financial crises to the real economy.
Bernanke and Gertler (1999), in their very influencial paper, defend that, because price
and financial stability are highly complementary and consistent objectives, when policymakers
pursue the former objective they are indirectly contributing to the second. Therefore, according
to these authors, a flexible inflation targeting regime is the most adequate monetary strategy
to deal with non-fundamental movements in asset prices. That is, according to this monetary
strategy central banks should adjust their policy instrument whenever expected inflation deviates
from the target and monetary policy should, therefore, respond to movements in asset prices only
insofar as they aﬀect expected inflation. This view as been criticised by several authors, among
them Olivier Blanchard (2000) and William Dupor (2002), on the argument that an inflation
targeting regime, when investment is under the influence of a non-fundamental component in
asset prices, will result in an excess of capital accumulation. In this paper we have simulated the
eﬀects of diﬀerent policy rules in a sticky price model wih endogenous investment and adjustment
costs in order to analyse the benefits of monetary policy reacting to asset prices when invesment
is under the influence of sentiment, that is, under the influence of some form of irrationality.
The conclusions of our simulations can be summarised as follows.
There are gains in terms of welfare from reacting to the non-fundamental shock and to the
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asset price itself, in both the Taylor rule and the inflation-forecast targeting rule. Benefits from
reacting to the non-fundamental shock and to asset prices result from a more stable output gap,
which is the consequence of a more stable investment. Therefore, results don’t seem to support
the view of Bernanke and Gertler (99) for whom a flexible inflation-targeting regime is the most
appropriate monetary policy strategy to deal with asset price run-up whether or not it is driven
by non-fundamental movements. We also conclude that, as in Alexandre and Bação (2002),
the origin of the shock matters for the decision of whether reacting to asset prices and that, as
Cecchetti et al (2000) argue, monetary policy should lean against the wind of significant asset
price movements if these disturbances originate in the asset markets themselves;
Asset price and inflation seem to be more stable when the policy instrument reacts to asset
price in addition to deviations of the expected inflation from the target, when the economy is
hit by a non-fundamental shock. This seems to support the argument set forth in Cecchetti et
al (2000) that central bankers that pursue price stability will more easily reach that target by
reacting to asset prices. However, that result contrasts with the result in Dupor (2002), in the
context of a fully optimal policy rule, that finds that asset price stabilisation is achieve at a
higher cost in terms of inflation volatility.
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8 Appendix 1
Casares and McCallum (2000) consider an economy populated by a large number of households-
firms. The representative household-firm seeks at time t to maximise the following intertemporal
utility function, separable in consumption and labour,
Et
∞X
j=0
βjU
³
ct+j ,mt+j , υt+j , ξt+j
´
(16)
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Where β ∈(0,1) is the household’s discount factor. Households consume many goods and the
aggregate ct, the household’s consumption during t, therefore represents a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977)
index representing the number of bundles consumed.
Each household-firm produces its diﬀerentiated good using a Cobb-Douglas technology,
yt = (atnt)
1−α kαt (17)
where a is a labour-augmenting technology, n is the labour input and K the stock of capital
held at the beginning of t.
The demand for the household-firm’s diﬀerentiated output is given by,
Y At
Ã
Pt
PAt
!−θ
(18)
With Y At the aggregate demand, P the money price of the household-firm’s product, and P
A
t
the aggregate price level.
The household inelastically supplies one unit of labour per period to a labour market from
which household-firms purchase labour inputs at the real wage rate of wt.
Gross investment, xt, is defined as,
xt = kt+1 − (1− δ)kt (19)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital. The realization of investment implies adjustment
costs of the type,
C(xt, kt) = κ
xη+1t
kηt
(20)
where total adjustment cost depends not only on the amount of new capital invested but
also on the stock of capital. With this specification of adjustment costs the production function
net of adjustment costs exhibits constant returns to scale. Additionally, this specification makes
the average value of Tobin’s q equal to its marginal value, as shown in Hayashi (1982).
There is also a market for one-period government bonds, bt+1, on which the real rate of
interest is rt, where (1+ rt)−1 is the real purchase price of a bond that is redeemed for one unit
of output in the next period.
The household’s budget constraint at t is thus given by,
Y At
Ã
Pt
PAt
!1−θ
− C(xt, kt) = ct + kt+1−(1−δ)kt+mt− 11+πt+wt(nt−1)+
1
1+rt
bt+1−bt (21)
From the household-firm’s first-order optimality conditions they obtain the log-linear ap-
proximation around the steady state in the paper.
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non-fundamental shock effect on consumption
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non-fundamental shock effect on inflation
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non-fundamental shock effect on output gap
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technology shock effect on inflation
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technology shock effect on the real interest rate
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IFT+q policy rule
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